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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a court trial, the district court found Mr. Meyers guilty of felony grand theft.
In the weeks before the court trial, Mr. Meyers sent a letter to the district court stating he wanted
to proceed pro se. However, the district court did not address Mr. Meyers’ request to proceed
pro se. On appeal, Mr. Meyers asserts the district court violated his constitutional right to selfrepresentation, when it ignored his request to proceed pro se.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Meyers by Information with one count of grand theft, felony,
I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b), and 18-2409. (R., pp.43-44.) Mr. Meyers entered a not
guilty plea. (R., p.51.) He also requested a court trial. (R., p.51.)
The day of the court trial, the district court vacated the trial and ordered Mr. Meyers
undergo a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-211. (See Tr., p.50, L.13 – p.51, L.15.)
The evaluation found Mr. Meyers was competent to stand trial, but his competence appeared to
be tenuous, and the State requested the district court order another Section 18-211 evaluation.
(See Tr., p.54, L.11 – p.56, L.6.) The district court ordered a second evaluation; after the second
evaluation determined Mr. Meyers was not competent to proceed, the district court ordered his
commitment for mental health treatment under I.C. § 18-212. (See Tr., p.57, Ls.11-25, p.64, L.9
– p.65, L.8.)
About two months later, the district court found Mr. Meyers was competent to proceed.
(See Tr., p.68, L.1 – p.69, L.3.)

When the district court proposed scheduling the court trial

during the week between Christmas and New Year’s, Mr. Meyers expressed a preference for that
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range of dates, but his counsel and the State had misgivings. (See Tr., p.70, Ls.4-24.) The
district court then set the court trial for January 25, 2017. (Tr., p.70, L.25 – p.71, L.8.)
On December 14, 2016, the day after the district court scheduled the court trial,
Mr. Meyers, filed, pro se, a letter with the district court.

(R., pp.82-83.)

In the letter,

Mr. Meyers wrote, “Your Honor, I respectfully request the Court to hold my one-day bench trial
between December 25th and January 1st, as you suggested.” (R., p.82.) Mr. Meyers wrote he had
“fired [counsel] and notified his supervisor . . . .” (R., p.82.) He then stated, “I am prepared to
represent myself in this matter and will present my defense as soon as possible.” (R., p.82.)
Mr. Meyers explained part of the reason for dismissing counsel was that he had obtained
funding for transitional housing, but the funding was only good for thirty days. (R., p.82.) Thus,
Mr. Meyers wrote, “I must resolve this case before [counsel’s] suggested January 25th court date
or lose the funding.” (R., pp.82-83.) Mr. Meyers ended the letter by stating, “I choose to
exercise the right to defend myself in this matter.” (R., p.83.)
However, the district court did not conduct a hearing on Mr. Meyers’ letter or otherwise
respond to his request to proceed pro se. (See generally R., pp.82-91.) At the start of the court
trial on January 25, 2017, the district court confirmed that Mr. Meyers was comfortable with his
decision to waive a jury trial. (See Tr., p.73, Ls.1-20.) The district court then asked the parties,
“[a]nything we need to take up before we get started then?” (Tr., p.73, Ls.21-22.) Mr. Meyers
and his counsel (an attorney different from the attorney discussed in the December 14, 2016,
letter) did not bring up Mr. Meyers’ request to proceed pro se. (See Tr., p.73, L.23 – p.74, L.8.)
During the court trial, Mr. Meyers testified he had been living at a sober living residence
in Boise following his release on parole. (See Tr., p.139, L.12 – p.140, L.8, p.162, Ls.10-13.)
Mr. Meyers had plans to start several businesses and charitable ventures. (See Tr., p.153, L.7 –
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p.160, L.10; Def. Ex. A.) He had barely been sleeping the whole time he was at the sober living
residence, because he was too excited. (See Tr., p.173, L.12 – p.174, L.5, p.175, Ls.14-16.)
Mr. Meyers testified that, five days into his release on parole, he bought a car, but the car
had mechanical issues. (See Tr., p.174, L.25 – p.175, L.10.) The car stopped running while
Mr. Meyers was trying to get back to the sober living residence in time for his 10:00 pm curfew.
(See Tr., p.176, L.3 – p.178, L.10.)

Feeling overwhelmed, he sat in the car for about twenty

minutes. (See Tr., p.180, Ls.3-21, p.182, Ls.8-14.) He testified he then saw a running truck
parked nearby, and came under the delusion the truck was some kind of divine gift to him to help
him get back to the sober living residence. (See Tr., p.182, L.25 – p.183, L.13, p.185, Ls.17-22.)
Mr. Meyers testified he sat in front of the truck for about forty-five minutes, removed his
property from his car and loaded it into the truck, and then got into the truck and waited to see if
the owner would come out. (See Tr., p.187, L.16 – p.189, L.7.) After about ten or fifteen
minutes, he drove away. (Tr., p.189, Ls.8-15.)
Mr. Meyers testified that the delusion he was operating under dissipated as he was
driving, and he turned around after driving about three blocks and headed back to return the
truck. (See Tr., p.190, Ls.3-15.) However, he testified that when he slowed down and pulled up
to the house outside which the truck had parked, at least three men came running at the truck and
started pounding on it. (See Tr., p.191, Ls.1-8.) Mr. Meyers became scared and drove off. (See
Tr., p.191, L.16 – p.192, L.8.)
Ricardo Lopez testified he had purchased the truck for $17,000.00. (See Tr., p.91, L.16 –
p.92, L.15.) Around 8:00 pm on the night of the incident, he drove the truck to his father’s house
to drop off a family member. (Tr., p.93, L.25 – p.95, L.6.) When he went inside the house, he
parked the truck and left it running and unlocked. (Tr., p.95, Ls.7-15.) After about ten or fifteen
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minutes, Mr. Lopez’s brother told him the truck was gone.

(Tr., p.96, L.8 – p.97, L.4.)

Mr. Lopez went onto the street, but did not see the truck. (Tr., p.97, Ls.5-18.) A few minutes
later, he saw the truck driving in his direction. (Tr., p.97, L.19 – p.98, L.6.)
Mr. Lopez testified he approached the truck alone and waved it down. (Tr., p.98, Ls.1522.) He got close enough to the truck to touch it and see the driver. (Tr., p.99, L.13 – p.100,
L.5.) He testified the truck slowed down as he approached, but as soon as he touched it, the
driver floored it. (Tr., p.100, Ls.6-12.) Mr. Lopez and his family contacted law enforcement.
(Tr., p.101, L.5 – p.102, L.5.)
Sergeant Corey Smith and Officer Andria Matheus of the Boise Police Department
testified officers searched for the truck for about twenty to twenty-five minutes before stopping
it. (See Tr., p.79, L.11 – p.84, L.22, p.114, L.11 – p.118, L.4.) Officer Matheus identified the
driver as Mr. Meyers and booked him into jail. (See Tr., p.120, Ls.11-18.)
At the end of the court trial, the district court found Mr. Meyers guilty of grand theft.
(R., p.88; Tr., p.204, Ls.7-9.) Later, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years,
with two years fixed. (R., pp.109-12.)
Mr. Meyers filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.119-21; see R., pp.130-35 (Amended Notice of Appeal).)
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ISSUE
Did the district court violate Mr. Meyers’ constitutional right of self-representation, when it
ignored his request to proceed pro se?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Violated Mr. Meyers’ Constitutional Right To Self-Representation, When It
Ignored His Request To Proceed Pro Se

A.

Introduction
Mr. Meyers asserts the district court violated his right to self-representation, as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, when it ignored his
request to proceed pro se. The violation of Mr. Meyers’ right to self-representation requires that
his conviction be vacated.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment is at issue, this Court should

conduct an independent review of the record. For the related Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
the Idaho Supreme Court has held that where “the constitutional right to counsel is at issue, we
review the record independently to determine if this constitutional right has been abridged.”
State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 555 (1989).

C.

The District Court Violated Mr. Meyers’ Constitutional Right To Self-Representation
Mr. Meyers asserts the district court violated his constitutional right to self-

representation, when it ignored his request to proceed pro se. The Sixth Amendment provides
that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment also “guarantees to
a defendant in a criminal case the right to proceed pro se when he or she voluntarily and
intelligently elects to do so.” State v. Hoppe, 139 Idaho 871, 874 (2003) (citing Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860 (1989)).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[u]ltimately, the decision of whether to exercise the
right to counsel or proceed pro se is for the defendant to make. The role of the trial court is
simply to ensure that where the defendant waives the right to counsel he or she does so
knowingly and intelligently.” Lankford, 116 Idaho at 865. A defendant choosing to proceed pro
se “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a defendant is not
required to show good cause for his or her desire to exercise the right to self-representation.
Hoppe, 139 Idaho at 875. “The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal
consequences of a conviction. . . . And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to
his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the
lifeblood of the law.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held, “[t]he constitutional
right of self-representation, recognized in [Faretta], must be timely asserted. ‘A defendant must
(however) have a last clear chance to assert his constitutional right . . . before meaningful trial
proceedings have commenced.’” Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting
United States v. Chapman, 553 F.2d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 1977)). The Ninth Circuit in Fritz also
held, “a motion to proceed pro se is timely if made before the jury is empaneled, unless it is
shown to be a tactic to secure delay.” Id.
Here, Mr. Meyers timely asserted his right to self-representation by filing his letter on
December 14, 2016, over a month before the scheduled court trial date of January 25, 2017. (See
R., pp.82-83; Tr., p.70, L.25 – p.71, L.8.) Nothing in the record indicates the request to proceed
pro se was a delaying tactic; in his letter, Mr. Meyers stated he wanted the court trial date moved
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up. (See R., p.82.) He also wrote, “I am prepared to represent myself in this matter and will
present my defense as soon as is possible.” (R., p.82.) Further, Mr. Meyers definitively stated
at the end of the letter, “I choose to exercise the right to defend myself in this matter.” (R., p.83.)
Thus, Mr. Meyers, much like the defendant in Faretta, in the weeks before his trial “clearly and
unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and did not want
counsel.” See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836.
However, the district court did not respond to Mr. Meyers’ choice to exercise his right to
self-representation. (See generally R., pp.82-91; Tr., p.73, L.1 – p.74, L.8.) The district court
should have addressed Mr. Meyers’ request to proceed pro se, to give him the requisite last clear
chance to assert his constitutional right. See Fritz, 682 F.2d at 784. Also, the district court was
obligated to “ensure that where the defendant waives the right to counsel he or she does so
knowingly and intelligently.” See Lankford, 116 Idaho at 865. By instead ignoring Mr. Meyers’
request to proceed pro se, the district court violated his constitutional right to self-representation.
Additionally, even though Mr. Meyers did not bring up his request to proceed pro se
again (see generally R., pp.82-91; Tr., pp.73-74), he submits he did not thereby waive or
abandon his assertion of his right to self-representation. Although there does not appear to be a
published opinion in Idaho on point,1 cases from some other jurisdictions indicate a defendant
may waive his or her assertion of the right to self-representation through abandonment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The only plausible inference from
the defendant’s conduct is that he acquiesced in the denial by judicial inaction of his motion and
thereby deliberately relinquished his right of self-representation.”); People v. Trujeque, 349 P.3d

1

For the Court’s information, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in an
unpublished opinion, State v. Anderson, No. 42027, 2015 WL 6951758 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 9,
2015).
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103, 129 (Cal. 2015) (“A defendant’s waiver or abandonment of this constitutional right should
be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; such waiver or abandonment may be inferred from a
defendant’s conduct.”).
Under the standard used by the Arizona Court of Appeals, an appellate court will
examine “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant intended to abandon
a Faretta motion when the superior court fails to consider and rule on the motion . . . .” State v.
McLemore, 288 P.3d 775, 786 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). The Arizona Court of Appeals’ nonexhaustive list of “[i]nformative factors” includes a consideration of the defendant’s
opportunities to remind the court of a pending motion, defense counsel’s awareness of the
motion, any affirmative conduct by the defendant that would run counter to a desire for selfrepresentation, whether the defendant waited until after a conviction to complain about the
court’s failure to rule on the motion (thus indicating the defendant was gaming the system), and
the defendant’s experience in the criminal justice system and with waiving counsel. Id.
Here, the totality of the circumstances suggests Mr. Meyers did not abandon his request
to proceed pro se. The letter does not indicate that it was forwarded to Mr. Meyers’ counsel, so
counsel may not have been aware of Mr. Meyers’ desire to exercise his right to selfrepresentation (although he wrote he had fired his counsel and notified his counsel’s supervisor).
(See R., pp.82-83.) There does not appear to have been a hearing, where Mr. Meyers would have
had the opportunity to remind the district court of his request to proceed pro se, between the date
the district court scheduled the court trial and the date of the court trial. (See R., pp.81-85.)
While Mr. Meyers did not bring up his assertion of his right to self-representation at the
beginning of the court trial, the district court also did not inquire into his letter at that time. (See
Tr., p.73, L.1 – p.74, L.8.) Thus, Mr. Meyers did not waive or abandon his assertion of his right
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to self-representation. Cf. Hoppe, 139 Idaho at 875 (holding, in a case where the district court
erroneously ruled the defendant could not represent himself without showing “very good cause”
for doing so, that the defendant’s “failure to ask again on the morning of trial did not cure the
court’s prior error in denying him his right to self-representation”).
The district court, when it ignored Mr. Meyers’ request to proceed pro se, violated his
constitutional right to self-representation. Thus, the judgment against Mr. Meyers should be
vacated, and the case should be remanded for further proceedings. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Meyers respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction, and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of December, 2017.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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